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Abstract:  The objective of this article is to develop a precise and rigorous 
measurement of a bank’s operational VaR. We compare our model to the standard 
model frequently used in practice. This standard model is constructed based on 
lognormal and Poisson distributions which do not take into account any data which 
fall below the truncature threshold and undervalue banks’ exposure to risk. Our risk 
measurement also brings into account external operational losses that have been 
scaled to the studied bank. This, in effect, allows us to account for certain possible 
extreme losses which have not yet occurred. The GB2 proves to be a good candidate 
for consideration when determining the severity distribution of operational losses. As 
the GB2 has already been applied recently in several financial domains, this article 
argues in favor of the relevance of its application in modeling operational risk. For the 
tails of the distributions, we have chosen the Pareto distribution. We have also shown 
that the Poisson model, unlike the negative-binomial model, is retained in none of the 
cases for frequencies. Finally, we show that the operational VaR is largely 
underestimated when the calculations are based solely on internal data. 
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Résumé: L’objectif de cette recherche est de développer une mesure précise et 
rigoureuse de la valeur à risque opérationnel (VaRO) d’une banque. Nous 
comparons notre modèle au modèle standard fréquemment utilisé dans le marché. 
Ce modèle est construit en utilisant les distributions Poisson et lognormale, qui ne 
tiennent pas compte des pertes inférieures aux seuils de troncature et sous-évaluent 
l’exposition au risque des banques. Notre mesure de risque comprend également 
l’information obtenue de pertes opérationnelles externes mises à l’échelle à la taille 
de la banque étudiée. Ceci permet de tenir compte de certaines pertes potentielles 
non survenues à la banque. La distribution GB2 a été considérée comme étant une 
bonne candidate pour représenter la sévérité des pertes opérationnelles. Comme 
cette distribution a déjà été appliquée dans plusieurs secteurs financiers, nous 
argumentons en faveur de son utilisation. La distribution Pareto a été utilisée pour 
estimer les queux des distributions. Nous avons rejeté la distribution de Poisson dans 
tous les cas. La distribution binomiale négative performe le mieux en ce qui concerne 
les fréquences. Finalement, nous avons montré que la VaRO est largement sous-
estimée lorsque les calculs sont uniquement basés sur des données internes. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the recent years, there is an increasing interest from financial institutions to identify losses 
associated with operational risk. This is due to regulatory considerations according to Basel II accord and 
also due to the occurrence of huge operational losses recently. We can mention two examples of enormous 
operational losses sustained by the financial sector: $2.4 billion lawsuit CIBC sustained by the 
shareholders of Enron and a $690 million loss caused by a rogue trading activities at Allied Irish Banks. 
Add to these the case of Barings, the UK’s oldest bank; it went bankrupt following a rogue trading 
activities too occasioning a loss of $1.3 billion. These examples show the scope of this risk. They also 
serve as an imperative warning signal to financial institutions, which must define, measure, and manage 
this risk. Besides the huge losses it can cause, operational risk also threatens all the activities and 
operations of an institution. Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events. Legal risk is also included, but the definition does 
not take into account strategic and reputational risk.  Regulatory authorities have identified three different 
methods of calculating this capital. The most advanced of these three methods shows greater sensitivity in 
its detection of risk. In this article, we use the advanced approach in dealing with our research problem. 
A rather recent concept, Value at Risk (VaR) is being more and more frequently used in finance. 
Though this measurement is not always considered coherent (Artzner and al., 1999), there is more and 
more talk about market VaR, credit VaR, and, recently, operational VaR. As a measurement, VaR is 
indeed easy to calculate and to implement in practice. In this article, we look at operational VaR for a 
bank and go through all the steps needed to calculate it. 
Operational risk has several distinctive characteristics that differentiate it from market and credit 
risk. Its structure of infrequent and potentially very high losses makes the task of modeling it difficult and 
sometimes complex. Some studies have advanced rather strong but somewhat unrealistic hypotheses 
which will certainly simplify the methodology, but also enormously weaken its ability to calculate either 
operational capital or the VaR exactly. 
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The objective of this article is to develop a precise and rigorous measurement of a bank’s 
operational VaR. We compare our model to the standard model frequently used in practice. This standard 
model is constructed based on lognormal and Poisson distributions which do not take into account any 
data that fall below the truncature threshold. We show our model’s superiority in providing more realistic 
results, unlike the standard model which greatly undervalues a bank’s exposure to risk. 
This article puts the accent on achieving the right fit between the parametric distributions and the 
empirical sample of operational losses and aims to show how important it is to make the right choice of 
distributions for the frequency and severity of losses. These elements are in effect missing in the standard 
model. Our risk measurement also brings into account external operational losses which have been scaled 
to the studied bank. This, in effect, allows us to account for certain possible extreme losses that have not 
yet occurred. We look to see what impact integrating this data on extreme losses may have on the 
calculation of the VaR. 
The article is structured as follows. The next section takes a brief glance at the recent literature on 
modeling operational risk and presents the motivation and objectives of our research. A description of the 
data used in our analysis is then presented in Section 3. Section 4 develops the model for the severity of 
losses, while the model for frequency is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 compares our results to those of 
the standard method. Finally, the last section sums up the main findings and suggests extensions and 
avenues of research. 
2. Review of Literature, Motivation and Objectives 
Several methods of calculating operational risk capital have been proposed by regulatory 
authorities. The advanced measurement method is the one which gives the best picture of a financial 
institution’s level of exposure to operational risk. Many number of studies have emerged which develop 
quantitative methodologies and tools applicable to the advanced measurement approach (Cruz, 2002; 
Alexamder, 2003; King, 2001). The Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) method is the most popular 
advanced measurement approach. This approach draws heavily on the actuarial model used to model 
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losses in the field of insurance (Cummins and Freifelder, 1978). Klugman, Panjer, and Willmot (1998) 
have carefully developed the different steps of this method. However, modeling operational losses 
diverges somewhat from these actuarial loss models. 
First of all, operational losses are, in most cases, collected at certain thresholds ($1,000, $10,000, 
$15,000, etc.) Several studies have left out these losses and therefore have not taken the threshold 
truncature into account (Dutta and Perry, 2006; Böcker and Klûppelberg, 2005; Fontnouvelle, Rosengren, 
and Jordan, 2004). This approach, as defined by Chernobai et al (2006), consists in fitting the non-
conditional severity-and-frequency distributions to loss data above the truncature threshold. It supposes 
that only the tails of the aggregated distributions will be taken into account when calculating the VaR. 
There are studies which consider only the modeling of the tail of the aggregated distribution. Using 
the extreme value theory (EVT), they treat only extreme losses (Embrechts et al, 1997; Ebnother, Vanini, 
McNeil, and Antolinez-Fehr, 2001). The structure of the operational data, however does not necessarily 
satisfy the standard hypotheses for modeling with the EVT. This is principally due to the limited number 
and frequency of extreme losses (Embrechts et al, 2003; Moscadelli, 2004). 
Losses below the collection threshold can have a significant impact on the level of capital, 
especially when the threshold is high and the frequency of these losses are quite high (Frachot, 
Moudoulaud, and Roncalli, 2003). It is worth noting that modeling truncated data makes the estimation 
methodology more complex, especially for distributions with several parameters. The works of Baud et al 
(2002), Frachot et al (2003), de Fontnouvelle et al (2003), Chapelle et al (2004), and Chernobai et al 
(2005a, 2005c) have shown how important it is to take the truncature threshold into consideration when 
modeling operational losses. There also exist goodness of fit tests developed for left-truncated samples by 
Chernobai, Rachev, and Fabozzi (2005b). In our study, we are going to consider the collection threshold 
and then model the operational losses in consequence. We shall also consider the estimation of tails by 
dividing the distribution into body and tail, in a manner similar to that used by Chapelle, Crama, Hübner, 
and Peters (2004). 
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The choice of severity distributions is also very important. Indeed, poor specification of this 
distribution can result in an under- or over-estimation of capital, as the study by Chernobai et al (2005c) 
has shown. The distribution most often used to estimate amounts of losses is the lognormal, because it is 
easy to implement and has a relatively thick tail. The works of Frachot et al (2003), Chernobai et al 
(2005a), and Bee (2006) have relied solely on this distribution to model the amounts of operational losses 
and they do so without even checking the goodness of its fit to the data. 
We shall test four distributions: the exponential, the lognormal, the Weibull and the four-parameter 
GB2 on the body of the distribution, and the Pareto distribution on the tail. Dutta and Perry (2006) have 
also tested several distributions, including the GB2 and the four-parameter g- and-h distribution. They 
have shown that the g-and-h distribution is the best model for severity. On the other hand, they have 
affirmed that the parameters estimated by the GB2 are not reasonable, while stressing the complexity of 
estimating these parameters and the difficulty of generating random numbers with this distribution. In this 
study, we shall present parameters estimated with the GB2 and show that the GB2 is the best among all of 
the distributions we have tested. 
As to the occurrence of losses, little research has been done to improve the degree of fitting the 
frequency distributions to the data. Most of the studies (Dutta and Perry, 2006; Chapelle et al, 2004; 
Chernobai et al, 2005a, de Fontnouvelle et al, 2003, Frachot et al, 2003) suppose that the frequencies are 
modeled using the Poisson distribution. Böcker and Klüppelberg (2003) have developed an approximation 
of the VaR whose formula takes into account only the expected number of losses. However, the Poisson 
distribution is characterized by equidispersion, that is, equality between the mean and the variance, which 
is rarely the case in operational risk. In the present study, we shall test the Poisson and negative-binomial 
models for a better fit with the frequencies. The test will be done with a parametric-bootstrap test that 
we shall set up. 
2χ
We shall also correct the parameters of the frequency distributions to take into account the fact that 
we know only the number of losses that exceed the threshold. To our knowledge, only the study of 
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Frachot, Moudoulaud, and Roncalli (2003) has suitably determined the Poisson distribution. No similar 
work has been done for the negative-binomial distribution 
Chernobai, Menn, Rachev, Truck, and Moscadelli (2006) have presented the different approaches 
used to treat truncated data. The approach most often used in practice consists of ignoring the missing 
observations and treating the truncated sample as if it were complete. The second approach consists in 
estimating the non-conditional severity distribution, while correcting only the parameters of the frequency 
distribution to take into account the number of losses below the threshold. The third approach consists of 
taking the truncature into account only in the severity distribution. The bias linked to this approach is 
weaker, but the method still has shortcomings, since the parameters of the frequency distribution have not 
been corrected. Finally, the last approach consists of estimating the conditional severity distribution and 
correcting the parameters of the frequency distribution. This method is statistically more adequate 
compared to other approaches, for it effectively reduces the bias associated with the calculation of capital. 
We shall thus be following this approach in this article. 
Remember that, since they do not reflect the real scope of losses, internal loss data are not sufficient 
for modeling the VaR at a 99.9% confidence level. Regulatory authorities have required that external data 
be used to complete the internal data when the latter are not exhaustive. We thus combine internal and 
external data before calculating the unexpected loss. Few studies have developed the LDA method by 
taking into account both the internal and external data (Chapelle, Crama, Hübner, and Peters, 2004). 
3. The Data 
 3.1 Description of the Data 
We shall apply the different methods of fitting and estimating parameters on a Canadian Bank’s 
internal loss while twinning them with external data. We model the losses according to their type of risk. 
The different types of risk defined by the regulatory authorities are damage to physical assets (DPA); 
external fraud (EF); clients, products and business practices (CPBP); internal fraud (IF); execution, 
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delivery and process management (EDPM); employment, practices, and workplace safety (EPWS) and 
business disruptions and systems failures (BDSF). 
To ensure that each of the study’s cells will contain a sufficient number of observations, we make 
no division based on the business unit, contrary to the recommendation made by the regulatory authorities. 
Besides, modeling losses by type of risk has the advantage of producing homogeneous loss processes. One 
exception is made for the BDSF type of risk, for which the quantity of loss data is low even at the bank 
level. This type of risk will thus be excluded from the study. 
The loss data cover a 3-year period running from 1 November 2001 to 31 October 2004. The 
collection threshold is set at the same level s for all the risk types with the exception of EF and IF, for 
which we have at our disposal all the losses having occurred at the bank. In the next section, we shall look 
for the distribution with the best fit for the amounts of losses incurred by the six types of risk. Given the 
differences in number and characteristics between the 6 samples (one sample per type of risk), different 
methods will be implemented. 
We should mention that we have excluded all the internal losses of more than $1 million US from 
our sample. These losses will be added to the external base (Fitch’s OpVaR) containing extreme losses of 
over $1 million US. So we have two independent samples. The first is made up of losses of less than $1 
million, whereas the second contains external losses scaled to the Canadian bank in question. This makes 
it easier to combine these two samples when calculating the operational VaR using Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
 3.2 Descriptive Statistics on the Amounts of Losses 
The number of data by type of risk is extremely variable. Table 1a shows that, for the whole bank 
over the 3-year period, we dispose of only 53 events in the DPA risk category which exceed s, whereas 
there are 22,178 events involving EF (13,149 of which are below s), mainly linked to card fraud (credit or 
debit cards). 
As for the mean of losses per event, we note that the highest means are linked to the following types 
of risk: CPBP and EPWS. Indeed, these losses are generally the result of legal actions taken by either 
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clients or employees. The mean of losses in EF is on the order of $2,049, if all the data are taken into 
account. We thus note that EF is a high-frequency and low-severity risk when compared to the type EPWS 
where the number of losses is only 97 but the mean loss is $34,220. This observation confirms the fact 
that the amounts of losses by type of risk exhibit different characteristics which justify the distribution by 
type of risk. 
We must admit that the loss data are far from symmetrical in their distribution. A simple 
comparison between the mean and the median indicates that, in all cases, the median is much lower than 
the mean, representing a clear indication of asymmetrical distributions. This observation is confirmed by 
the calculation of the asymmetrical coefficient which is positive in all cases, thus favoring thicker tails. 
And the very high smoothing coefficients show the existence of leptokurtic distributions with thick tails. 
We cite the example of the EF type of risk where the smoothing coefficient is on the order of 2,722 and 
the asymmetry coefficient is evaluated at 46. We in effect note that 98% of the losses are below $10,000. 
 3.3 Descriptive Statistics on Loss Frequencies 
A detailed analysis of the number of daily losses shows us that the frequencies of these losses over 
the days of the week are not identically distributed. We noted that the frequencies are lower over the 
weekends. It is possible that there are fewer losses on days when banking institutions are closed. However, 
it is hard to admit that there should be fewer loss events related to certain types of risk (such as EF…) on 
weekends than on other days. This result may be due to a bias in the accounting date of the loss. 
Therefore, one way of getting around this problem is to consider the number of losses by week. This will 
however mean losing some observations, since we limit our sample to 106 frequencies. 
Table 1b presents the descriptive statistics for weekly loss frequencies. We note that the means are 
lower than the variances, which favors over-dispersion distributions for modeling the frequencies. It is 
also worth mentioning that we have checked for any end-of-month or end-of-year concentrations which 
might distort the whole modeling of the frequencies. It is hard to detect any possible end-of-year 
concentration since we have only a 3-year history. On the other hand, we have noticed a slight 
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concentration at the end of months for losses of the type, EDPM. The distribution of losses for the other 
types of risk is uniform over the days and weeks of the month. 
The LDA model thus consists in estimating the severity and frequency distributions and 
determining a certain centile of the distribution of the S (aggregated distribution). The aggregated loss by 
period is obtained either with a Fourier transformation, as proposed by Klugman et al (2004), or with a 
Monte Carlo simulation, or by analytical approximation. In what follows, we shall estimate each of the 
severity and frequency distributions and determine the operational VaR by risk type. 
4. Estimation of the Severity Distribution 
The first step in applying the LDA method to calculate capital consists in finding the parametric 
distributions which offer the best fit for the historical data on loss amounts. The unbiased estimation of the 
parameters of these distributions will have an enormous influence on the results of operational capital. In 
this section, we shall explore several methods for estimating the distribution, so that we can achieve a 
better fit for all the historical data. 
The method will, in fact, vary depending on the nature of the data and their characteristics. We 
begin by estimating the distribution based on all the loss data. However, if the goodness of fit tests we set 
up rejects these distributions, we must then adopt another method. In this case, it is indeed possible to 
divide the distribution (especially if the size of the sample permits it) and, consequently, to fit a 
distribution to each part of the empirical distribution. 
Besides considering the behavior of losses and the number of data when choosing the fitting method 
for severity distributions, the collection threshold for data is also of great importance. In the context of 
operational risk, most financial institutions have chosen a level at which operational losses will be 
collected. The fact of using truncated data changes the usual method of estimating parameters. This 
threshold must thus be taken into account when estimating the parameters. 
In the literature, several estimation methods are proposed for estimating parameters. We can cite the 
maximum likelihood method and the method of moments, among others. However, the latter method 
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proves harder to use with truncated data, since finding the moments of a truncated distribution is more 
complicated than estimating the parameters of a distribution whose data are not truncated. It is, however, 
always possible to estimate the parameters of the distribution of the losses exceeding the collection 
threshold (Dutta and Perry, 2006). This approach certainly brings us back to the usual estimation of 
distribution parameters, but it leaves out losses lower than the collection threshold, seeing that the 
distribution does not take them into account. Thus, we can only generate surplus losses with the 
distribution chosen. This method poses a problem of underestimation or overestimation of capital, 
especially if the threshold is high enough and the volume of small losses is appreciable. If this method is 
used, this bias must be corrected. 
Our first step is to identify the distributions which will be tested. We then describe the different 
estimation methods according to the nature of the data. Finally, we present the results of the estimation for 
each type of risk and the four distributions tested. 
 4.1 Distributions Tested 
We start by choosing among the various parametric distributions the one which gives the best fit for 
the loss data. Theoretically, all the continuous distributions with a positive domain of definition are 
candidates for severity-distribution modeling. Instead of limiting ourselves to a single distribution as do 
most practitioners in the industry, it is better to start by testing different distributions—simple 
distributions (with a single parameter) like the exponential; common distributions like the lognormal or 
the Weibull (with two parameters); and more complex but flexible distributions like the GB2 (with four 
parameters). We describe the characteristics of each of them and we present their density and cumulative 
function in the summary table 2 
First of all, we test the exponential distribution which offers the advantage of being simple (with 
just one parameter). Next, the lognormal distribution is tested. This two-parameter distribution is 
commonly used in practice. And this distribution is, by hypothesis, taken as one which fits loss amounts in 
several studies (Chernobai, Menn, Truck, and Rachev, 2005b; Frachot, Moudoulaud, and Roncalli, 2003). 
Both this distribution and the exponential distribution are characterized by moderately thick tails. The 
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two-parameter Weibull distribution is also tested. Unlike the two preceding distributions, this one has a 
thin tail. These three distributions thus offer tails of different thickness. 
Finally, we also test a family of four-parameter distributions. Though certainly less often used than 
the others in practice, these distributions do offer a great deal of flexibility. In effect, their four parameters 
allow them to take numerous forms and to display tails of different thickness.  
In specific cases, we also propose the Pareto distribution for estimating the tails. The Pareto can be 
presented by introducing a -scale parameter. Suppose that Z follows an β α -parameter Pareto distribution, 
the random variable  follows a Pareto distribution with an a shape parameter  and a scale 
parameter β . The f density function and the F cumulative function are respectively the following:  
ZX β= α
( ) β≥αβ=βα +α
α
or   x    1 fx
,,xf ;      ( ) β≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ β−=βα
α
or   x   1 f
x
,,xF . 
 4.2 Modeling all the Data 
Modeling the amounts of losses will differ according to the data and their characteristics. A first 
step is to model all the loss data. This involves the types of risk IF and EF for which all the operational 
loss data are collected. The results of the estimation will be presented only for the risk of IF. The results of 
the estimation of the parameters related to losses from EF will not be presented, since the goodness of fit 
tests reject all the distributions tested. We shall thus propose another method for modeling these losses in 
Section 4.3. Since this model is well known in the literature, it will not be presented here. Given that 
certain losses related to certain types of risk are truncated whereas others are not, it is important to 
distinguish between the two estimation models. We develop now the estimation method to be used for 
truncated data. 
 To account for the losses not collected, we estimate the conditional parameters only when the 
losses observed exceed the collection threshold. 
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Let there be: s: The collection threshold; y: The amounts of losses observed, with y ≥ s; n: 
The number of losses collected; D: A continuous severity distribution whose parameters are represented 
by the θ vector. 
The density and the cumulative functions of the conditional distribution D arising from the fact that 
only y is seen to exceed the threshold s are written as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) syfor    ,sF1
,yfsy|,yf ≥θ−
θ=≥θ ;     ( ) ( ) ( )( ) syfor     ,sF1
,sF,yFsy|,yF ≥θ−
θ−θ=≥θ  
We have selected to estimate the parameters by optimization of the maximum likelihood method. 
The optimal solution  solves: MLEθ
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )                         1 
1
θ−−θ=θ ∑
=
,sFnLog,yfLog,yL
n
i
ii              (2) 
Among the losses in our base, we have those related to the following types of risk: DPA; EPWS; 
EDPM; and CPBP. The goodness of fit tests that we set up has rejected the fitting of all the distributions 
proposed for the last two types previously cited. We shall not present these results. Instead, we shall 
model them using another method that we develop in the next section. 
4.3 Division of the Distribution 
In some cases the parametric distributions tested do not fit all the data. This is generally the case 
when there are very numerous losses or when their empirical distribution has two peaks, etc. In this case, 
we propose to divide the empirical distribution into parts and to fit the parametric distributions for each 
part. Several articles in the literature treat the subject of fitting tails of distribution, mainly from the 
perspective of the theory of extreme values. However, fitting only the tail of the distribution means 
neglecting the body of the distribution, whereas the latter should play its part in calculating capital and 
could have a significant impact. 
There is no one way to divide a distribution, the important thing being able to find a good fit. The 
division should go hand in hand with the objective of the fit. In other words, if we make the fitting in 
order to estimate capital at a 99.9% level, the tails of the distributions will thus come into play. The 
 12
quality of the fitting is essential to avoiding an under- or over-estimation of the capital. Thus, in our case, 
it is important to make an accurate estimation of the tail or the right wing of the distribution of losses. 
Once the distribution of the tails has been estimated, the body of the distribution should be 
estimated. If we fail to obtain a good fit with the distributions tested, we shall divide the body of the 
distribution into two or more parts. In what follows, we shall present an estimation method for the left, 
centre, and tail of the distribution. 
Modeling with a single parametric distribution did not give conclusive results for the following 
types of losses: CPBP, EDPM, and EF. Consequently, we opted for dividing the distribution. It should be 
pointed out that to apply this method it is important to have a sufficiently high number of observations. 
We must, in effect, have enough data in each part to allow the estimation of the parameters of the 
distribution. This condition is quite well satisfied for the types of risk to be modeled in this section. 
 4.3.1 Estimation of the tail of the distribution 
In what follows, we plan to model the tails of the empirical distributions. We first choose several sq 
loss thresholds corresponding to different high centiles. We next estimate the parameter of the Pareto 
distribution for each of the loss samples higher than the different sq thresholds. Finally, we select the 
threshold for which the Pareto gives the best fit (the distribution for which the p-value of the goodness of 
fit test is the highest). This method is similar to the one developed by Peters et al (2004). 
We have chosen high centiles in order to get a good fitting for the tail. However, it is important to 
keep enough observations to carry out the estimation. We have decided that at least 50 observations must 
be kept just for estimating the shape parameter α  of the Pareto for each of the risk types. 
Let there be: sq: Loss threshold corresponding to the quantity q, this threshold corresponds to the 
scale parameter of the generalized Pareto. In effect, we shall each time suppose the scale parameter to be 
equal to the sq threshold and we estimate only the α  parameter; z:  Amounts of losses exceeding 
the sq threshold; nq: Number of observations z in the sample defined by ( ). qqii n...2,1i,sz|z =≥
The density function of the Pareto is thus: 
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( ) 1qq zss,,zf +α
αα=α  with . qsz ≥
For the maximum likelihood, the optimal α  parameter for the different sq thresholds is : 
 
∑
= ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=α qn
1i q
i
q
MLE
s
xLog
n  (3) 
We have thus estimated the  parameter corresponding to each sα q threshold for each of the three 
types of risk previously cited. The goodness of fit tests allows us to choose the threshold providing the 
best fit for the tail. 
 4.3.2 Estimation of the body of the distribution 
Once the tail of the distribution has been modeled, it is then a matter of estimating the distribution 
which fits the body of the empirical distribution best. Knowing that this latter distribution is represented 
by all or part of the losses that fall below the centile threshold selected in the preceding section, we shall 
start with different exponential, lognormal, Weibull and GB2 distributions for the whole sample of losses. 
Let there be: sq: Threshold of loss tail selected corresponding to the q centile; : Amounts of 
losses falling below the s
'z
q threshold; : Number of  observations, being the number of 
; D: Distribution to be tested. 
'n 'z
qqii n...2,1i,s'z|'z =<
The density and the cumulative functions of the distribution D of the losses falling below the tail 
threshold selected are the following: 
( ) ( )( )θθ=<θ ,sF ,'zfs'z|,'zf qq ;  ( )
( )( )θθ=<θ ,sF ,'zFs'z|,'zF qq  
For the maximum likelihood, it is a matter of finding the θ  parameters which maximize the 
following function: 
  (4) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
         
1
θ−θ=θ ∑
=
,sFLog'n,'zfLog,'zL q
'n
i
ii
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However, as we have already seen, when the loss data are truncated, this must be taken into account 
in estimating the body of the distribution.  
Let there be: s: Collection threshold; sq: Tail threshold selected corresponding to the q centile;  
Amounts of losses lower than the sq tail threshold and higher than the collection threshold s; : Number 
of  observations, being the number of 
''z :
''n
''z qqii n...2 ,1i ,s''zs|''z =<< ; D: Distribution to be tested. 
The density function of the D distribution of the losses between the s threshold and the sq tail 
threshold selected is written: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )θ−θ θ=<≤θ ,sF,sF ,''zfs''zs|,''zf qq . 
For the maximum likelihood,  parameters maximize the following function: θ
 
  (5) 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
      
  
1
θ−θ−θ=θ ∑
=
,sF,sFLog''n,''zfLog,''zL q
''n
i
ii
This formula can be used when the data fall between the two thresholds or boundaries. For the risk 
type CPBP, we have modeled the losses found between the collection threshold and the tail threshold 
selected. The results of the estimation will be presented in Section 4.4. 
As to the types of risk EF and EDPM, modeling the body of the distribution with the parametric 
distributions proposed proved to be non-conclusive, since the goodness of fit tests failed to select any of 
them. In this case, we propose a different division of the distribution. We cite the example of the risk type 
EF where none of the distributions tested fit the data. A painstaking analysis of the losses from EF do in 
fact show that the empirical distribution of the data have two peaks, the second of which stands at the 
level of $5,000. We thus divide the distribution at the level of this point. We estimate the left wing of the 
distribution using the maximum likelihood method shown in equation (4). Seeing that the losses are 
contained between the two thresholds, the centre of the empirical distribution is estimated using another 
parametric distribution based on function (5) of the maximum likelihood. 
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As to the risk type EDPM, estimation of the left wing and the centre of the empirical distribution is 
done with the likelihood function (5), since the data are truncated at the collection threshold. 
We set up the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS), Anderson Darling (AD), and Cramér-von-Mises (CvM) 
tests along with the parametric bootstrap procedure. The Appendix A2.1 presents the algorithm for the KS 
parametric bootstrap procedure. It should be noted that, when applying the test, we must take the 
characteristics of the sample into account. In other terms, if the data are truncated or contained between 
two thresholds, a sample respecting the same condition must be generated in the parametric-bootstrap 
procedure before calculating the statistic. 
 4.4 Results from Estimation of the Parameters 
Table A1 presents the results obtained from estimating the distributions for the risk types IF, DPA, 
and EPWS. Unlike the other types of risk with truncated losses, losses connected with the IF risk are 
integral. The results of this type of risk synthesized in Table A1a show that the lognormal and GB2 
distributions fit the loss data well, whereas the fitting of the exponential and Weibull distributions are 
rejected. However, the lognormal distribution has a higher p-value than that of the GB2. We thus retain 
the lognormal distribution as the severity distribution which best describes the behavior of incidents of IF 
in the bank studied. 
Tables A1b and A1c present the results for the risk types: DPA, and EPWS. Remember that these 
losses are truncated at the s level. Only the lognormal and GB2 distributions offer a good fit for the 
truncated-losses data. The KS, AD, and CvM tests for the Weibull distribution could not be carried out for 
the two types of risk. Accounting for the truncature when modeling losses does, in fact, greatly complicate 
the estimation of distributions and standard tests could not be applied. For the types of risk DPA, and 
EPWS, we note that the results of the goodness of fit tests are similar for the lognormal and GB2 
distributions. In what follows, we opt for the lognormal, as it is simpler than the GB2. 
As for the other types of risk, we divide the empirical distribution, since none of the distributions 
can be retained with the first method. Moreover, since the number of observations is rather high for the 
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three samples, the division is possible, as is described in the preceding section. For the type of risk CPBP, 
we first estimate the tail of the distribution by testing the Pareto distribution on several samples of the tail 
corresponding to high centiles. The results in Table A2a allow us to retain the threshold of $62,000. In 
other words, losses above this threshold follow a 1.8 Pareto parameter. The losses below this threshold 
have been modeled by the four distributions cited in Section 4.1. The results of the goodness of fit tests 
(Table A2b) reject all the distributions except the GB2. We thus retain this distribution for modeling 
losses situated below the $62,000 threshold. 
We also begin by modeling the tail in the case of the risk type EDPM. Several thresholds 
corresponding to different centiles are chosen. Based on the three tests, the best fit of the Pareto is 
obtained for the $26,000 threshold corresponding to the 96% centile (Table A3). The parameter of the 
Pareto is estimated at 1.11. We next estimate the body of the distribution with the distributions proposed. 
None of the distributions fit the empirical data below the tail threshold. We have consequently divided the 
body of the distribution into two parts forming the left wing and the center of the distribution. The results 
in Table A3b, obtained from estimating the left wing (data contained between s and s’) of the distribution, 
show that only the GB2 offers a good fit for the historical data according to the p-value of the KS test. It 
should be mentioned that the estimation of the lognormal and Weibull distributions do not give coherent 
parameters. This fails to establish the KS, AD, and CvM tests. As for the centre of the distribution, we 
model the losses with the same distributions. The results from the goodness of fit test show that the 
lognormal and GB2 distributions offer a good fit. The comparison of the p-values of the two distributions 
favors the GB2 model (Table A3c). 
The same method is applied to the EF risk type. To estimate the tail, we test several thresholds 
corresponding to numerous centiles (between 0.85 and 0.997), since the tail of the sample allows us to do 
so (22, 179). We retain the threshold of $38,000 and the parameter of the Pareto is estimated at 1.33. We 
next divide the body of the empirical distribution, since attempts to find a fit for all the data below the tail 
threshold fail to produce conclusive results. We thus estimate the left wing of the distribution composed of 
losses below s’’. The results presented in Table A4b allow us to retain only the GB2. All tests in effect 
 17
reject the fit for the other distributions. Finally the centre of the empirical distribution is also modeled with 
a GB2 distribution. 
We should point out that, in each case, the exponential and Weibull distributions fail to offer a good 
fit for the data. In most cases, the GB2 distribution turns out to be the best candidate for modeling the 
amounts of operational losses. This confirms our initial hypothesis stipulating that, given its great 
flexibility, the GB2 would offer a good fit for the data. But we also note that estimating this distribution, 
especially for truncated data, is rather difficult. 
5. Estimation of the Frequency Distribution 
 5.1 Distributions Tested 
We propose the Poisson and negative binomial distributions for estimating the number of 
operational losses. Several studies have already used the Poisson to model operational losses, whereas few 
have used the negative binomial for this purpose. 
Let Y be a discrete positive random variable: 
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 5.2 Estimation of the Parameters 
For each of the six types of risk, we estimate the parameters of each of the two distributions using 
maximum likelihood. As we have already pointed out, we model both daily and weekly frequencies in 
order to correct any possible collection bias. 
Remember that, for certain types of risk (DPA, EPWS, CPBP and EDPM), the losses are collected 
only at a specific threshold. We have taken this truncature threshold into account in estimating the severity 
distribution. The same modeling has to be done for the frequencies. Note that these are not truncated 
frequency distributions. We in fact have at our disposal the number of losses above the collection 
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threshold. The parameters estimated must be corrected to account for the number of losses below the 
truncature threshold. 
 5.3 Correction of the Parameters 
For the Poisson distribution, Frachot et al (2003) have already proposed correcting the  parameter 
in order to account for the number of uncollected operational losses. We extend the case where the 
λ
λ  
parameter is random. 
Let there be: :The number of losses collected, : The number of real losses, X: The amount of the 
losses, s: The collection threshold, F: Cumulative function of the severity distribution, with: 
 ;   
obsy realy
( ) [ ]sXPrsF ≤=
Suppose that the frequency distribution of all the losses is random parameter Poisson . In what 
follows, we shall determine the distribution of the frequencies observed. The probability of observing i 
operational losses amounting to more than s is (Dahen, 2007): 
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1,binomial negative~Y , the parameters estimated based on the data observed are 
( )( )sF,~estimated βαΓλ . The number of losses collected thus follows a negative-binomial distribution of 
parameters ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
β+α sF1
1, . Thus, once the parameters of the negative binomial have been estimated, we 
correct these parameters to account for the unobserved frequencies of the losses below the collection 
threshold. The real parameters ( )realreal ,δα  are thus: 
estimatedreal α=α      and   ( )( )sF
sF
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estimated
real δ−
δ=δ
1
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Where the parameter  is defined such that δ β+=δ 1
1 . 
 At this stage, it is important to test the degree of fitting of the distributions estimated for the 
different periods chosen (daily and weekly) and for each of the types of risk. As we are dealing with 
discrete data, we cannot apply the same tests used earlier to test the severity distributions. We thus set up 
in the Appendix A2.2 a  test with parametric bootstrap, constructed in the same way as the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
2χ
 5.5 Results of the parameters’ estimation  
Table A5 presents the results of the estimation of the Poisson and negative-binomial distributions 
for each of the six types of risk. It is worth noting that in all the cases, the Poisson distribution is rejected 
by the  test. This confirms our expectations since the data present an over-dispersion that must be 
modeled by another distribution. This fact calls into question all the studies on the calculation of 
operational capital which use the Poisson model to estimate loss frequencies. The negative-binomial 
distribution offers a good fit for the daily or weekly loss numbers. 
2χ
Concerning the frequency period, we note that for the types of risk EF, IF, and EDPM (Tables A5a, 
A5b, A5f) the modeling works better when weekly frequencies are chosen. This fits in with our initial 
analysis showing a potential bias in accounting for certain losses. For the other types of risk, we retain the 
daily frequencies, as based on the values of the p-values of the  test (Tables A5c, A5d, A5e). 2χ
On the other hand the likelihood ratio test is higher than ( )1%,52χ  in all the cases. This result 
shows that we reject the null hypothesis stipulating that the over-dispersion coefficient is null. This fact 
confirms the previous results confirming rejection of the Poisson model. We thus retain the negative 
binomial model as the one with the best fit for the frequency data. We have also corrected the parameters 
to account for the loss numbers falling below the threshold for all the risk types except EF and IF. It 
should be mentioned that, based on the expertise and judgment of the directors of the bank studied, we fix 
F(s) exogenously. 
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6. Calculation of Operational VaR by Type of Risk 
 6.1 Aggregation of the Distributions with the Internal Data 
Remember that our objective is to estimate the annual value at risk at a 99.9% confidence level, as 
recommended by the regulatory authorities. We start by first determining the distribution which models 
the severity of operational risks by event for each of the risk types. The second step consists in 
determining the distribution which best fits the frequency data. At this stage of the analysis, it is suitable 
to aggregate the two distributions to obtain the aggregated distribution of the annual losses. Several 
aggregation methods, which we have already described, are available in the literature. We choose the 
Monte Carlo simulation method to derive the non-parametric distribution of the annual losses. This 
method is not the quickest but it has the advantage of being very precise. We apply the method already 
described by Cruz (2002) in the context of operational risk.  
 6.2 Comparison of our Model with the Standard Model 
We define the standard model as being the simple method frequently found in the literature and 
obtained based on the lognormal and the Poisson distributions. Moreover, no consideration is given to 
missing losses. We have chosen this model because it is frequently used in practice and has been the 
subject of several research studies. We shall thus test this model’s robustness compared to that of the 
model we have developed. We expect to find that poor specification of the distributions and their failure to 
fit all the data will bias the calculation of the capital required. 
We have also chosen only three types of risk to do this analysis: IF, EPWS and EF. These types of 
risk will allow us to compare our model to the standard model. In table A6, we present the results of the 
non-conditional estimation of the lognormal distribution. We also present the results obtained from 
modeling the number of weekly losses with the Poisson distribution. Since the standard model is used, no 
goodness of fit test is done. 
Table 3 compares the variation percentages for the mean of annual losses and the VaR (confidence 
levels at 90; 95; 99 and 99.9%) obtained with the standard model to those obtained with the model 
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developed in this study. We note that the results are very different in most of the cases. The standard 
model underestimates enormously the annual mean of losses and the VaR. 
For the type of risk IF, the data are not truncated and the severity distribution is the same in both 
models. Thus, the difference in the results of the two models measures the impact of the poorly specified 
frequency distribution for this type of risk. The mean of annual losses are almost equal, whereas a 
difference of as much as 2% is noted between the VaR of the two models. 
For the risk type EPWS, the data are truncated and the severity distribution is the same in both 
models. Thus, the difference in the results obtained by the two models measures the impact of the poorly 
specified frequency distribution and the failure to consider the truncature threshold for this type of risk. 
Thus, the underestimation of the mean of annual losses (-5%) and of the VaR (-27%) shows the 
importance of choosing the proper frequency distribution and of considering the data below the threshold. 
As to the type of risk EF, the severity and frequency distributions are not the same in the two 
models. The results will thus measure the impact of the poor choice of distributions on the mean of annual 
losses and on the VaR. In effect, the 99.9% VaR calculated with the standard model is underestimated (by 
82%) compared with the one calculated using our model. This confirms our expectations. It is important to 
choose distributions that fit the loss data well, in order to determine the level of capital reflecting a bank’s 
true exposure to operational risk. 
We also note that the underestimation is larger when the VaR confidence level is high. Indeed, for 
the type of risk EF, there is only a minimal difference in the means for annual losses between the two 
models, whereas this difference is on the order of 6% between the 90% VaRs and goes as high as 82% 
between the 99.9% VaRs. This thus shows that the standard model underestimates the thickness of the tail 
of the aggregated distribution. 
So this analysis shows that the poorly specified severity and frequency distributions result in serious 
biases in the calculation of capital. The VaR calculated with the standard model does not reflect at all the 
bank’s real exposure. Moreover, failure to consider the uncollected losses leads to an inaccurate and 
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biased estimation of capital. Our method is thus a good alternative to the standard model, since it allows 
an accurate description of the tails of the severity distributions without ignoring the body. 
 6.3 Combination of Internal and External Data 
The current context of operational risk imposes the use of external data for calculating the value at 
risk. Indeed, the losses collected do not reflect the bank’s real exposure, since certain less frequent, but 
potentially heavy losses are not necessarily captured in the internal data base. They can, nonetheless, have 
a serious influence on operational risk capital. This is mainly explained by the fact that the history of 
losses is short and the collection is not yet exhaustive. All these factors argue in favor of combining 
internal and external losses. External losses will be scaled by applying the same method used in Dahen 
and Dionne (2007). 
Concerning the severity distribution describing the behavior of external losses scaled to the 
Canadian bank studied, we shall take the split GB2 model estimated in the Dahen study (2007). On the 
other hand, the Dahen and Dionne study (2007) shows how it is possible to determine parameters of the 
frequency distribution which make it possible to scale and fit the data. We shall thus retain the negative-
binomial model with a regression component. 
From the theorem of Larsen and Marx (2001), we find that, if frequency losses of more than $1 M 
are independent and identically distributed according to a negative-binomial model, then the parameters of 
the annual negative-binomial distribution are ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ p,
11
ri  with ( )p,ri  the negative-binomial parameters 
determined based on the Dahen and Dionne study (2007) for modeling the number of losses on an 11-year 
horizon. 
Knowing the severity and frequency distribution, we shall aggregate them in the same way that we 
did for the internal data. We set up an algorithm in Appendix 3 which makes it possible to aggregate the 
internal and external data with a view to determining the empirical distribution of the annual losses and to 
calculating their 99.9th percentile.  
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 6.4 Determination of the VaR 
Table 4 presents the results of the mean of annual losses and the VaR calculated at the 95%, 99%, 
and 99.9% confidence level. These results take into account the internal losses collected within the bank 
as well as the external losses scaled to the financial institution under study. Out of respect for the 
confidentiality of the information from the bank studied, the results are presented as a percentage of the 
total assets of that bank in 2004. We present the results by type of risk and we show that the type of risk, 
CPBP presents the greatest operational value at risk. This confirms the result found by Dutta and Perry 
(2006) in their study based on data from 7 banks. The types of risk EF and EDPM come respectively in 
second and third position in terms of their VaR scope. The type of risk which presents the least risk is 
DPA. It is worth noting that this classification of types of risk is not respected when we observe the values 
of the mean of annual losses. 
 
 6.5 Impact of the Combination of Internal and External Data on the Results 
To highlight the impact of integrating external data in the calculation of the VaR, we consider three 
types of risk: DPA; EPWS and IF. We have chosen these types of risk because the internal base shows no 
extreme losses of over one million dollars for them. Thus, a comparison between the VaRs calculated with 
only internal data and those calculated based on the combination of internal and external data will show us 
the importance of external data for filling in the tails of the distributions. 
We calculate the mean of annual losses as well as the VaR of different centiles based on a first 
sample composed only of internal loss data, whereas the second sample incorporates external loss data for 
the three types of risk cited above. The results presented in table 5 show that the VaR is greatly 
underestimated when based solely on internal data. The underestimation reaches 99% for the type of risk 
IF (VaR at 99.9%). In effect, the losses linked to this type of risk can be too high, like the losses sustained 
by the Allied Irish Bank and Barings as the result of unauthorized transactions. Remember that no extreme 
events have occurred in the history of these three types of risk. Including the possibility of events of more 
 24
than one million dollars will make it possible to give a better description of the tails of the aggregated 
distributions and thus to reflect the level of unexpected losses. 
7. Conclusion 
The objective of this article is to construct a robust method for measuring operational capital. We 
have thus presented a method which consists in carefully choosing the right severity distribution, by 
making sure to take uncollected losses into account. The results have shown that in most cases the GB2 
distribution provides a good fit for all the data or for the body of the empirical distributions. The GB2 thus 
proves to be a good candidate for consideration when determining the severity distribution of operational 
losses. As the GB2 has already been applied recently in several financial domains, this article argues in 
favor of the relevance of its application in modeling operational risk. As to the tails of the distributions, 
we have chosen the Pareto distribution.We have also tested the Poisson and negative-binomial 
distributions for modeling the frequencies of losses. We have shown that, unlike the negative-binomial 
model, the Poisson model is retained in none of the cases. In order to take into account the number of 
losses falling below the collection threshold, a correction was made in the parameters estimated. 
In order to show the robustness of our model, we have compared it to the standard model 
constructed on the most commonly used distributions (lognormal and Poisson), but without considering 
the truncature threshold. The results have shown that the standard model greatly underestimates the 
operational value at risk. 
We have also set up an algorithm in order to combine the internal and external losses scaled to the 
Canadian bank studied. The results of the VaR reflect the reality more adequately, since the internal data 
do not include losses of a very large scope. Moreover, an analysis of the impact of the integration of 
external data on the VaR has revealed that it is largely underestimated when the calculations are based 
solely on internal data. This proves the importance of combining internal and external data in calculating a 
bank’s unexpected losses. 
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So this mode, as developed and applied to real data from a Canadian bank, can be implemented in 
any financial institution. However, note that there needs to be a sufficient number of data for a parametric 
modeling of distributions. We have fixed this number in an arbitrary fashion, since it is not the subject of 
this contribution. A statistical study making it possible to determine the minimal number required for 
modeling distributions would thus justify our choice. 
Remember that we have calculated the unexpected loss for only six types of risk. For the seventh 
type of risk Business Disruption and System Failures, the number of observations is limited, which 
prevents us from estimating the loss with the LDA method. We thus think that other methods based on 
qualitative factors can be applied, methods like scenario analysis (Scandizzo, 2006). It would be 
interesting to see how this method could be implemented in practice. It would also be interesting to 
calculate the aggregated capital of the whole bank. Taking into consideration the dependence between 
types of risk makes it possible to find the exact value of the aggregated capital. The copula theory can be 
used for this and can thus be an interesting avenue of research (Frachot, Roncalli, and Salomon, 2004 and 
Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, and Nešlehová, 2006). 
Besides, the case study done in this article can be used as a business case. If we dispose of the 
operational-risk capital allotted to all types of risk including the risk type Business Disruption and System 
Failures, it will be possible to use the copula theory to calculate the aggregated capital at the level of the 
bank. We can consequently compare the capital found with the advanced method to the capital calculated 
with the standardized or basic method. It is expected that the capital estimated with the advanced method 
will be lower than that found with other methods, when the true dependence between the types of risk is 
carefully evaluated. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
We present descriptive statistics for the amounts and frequencies of operational losses of a Canadian bank 
over the period running from 1/11/2001 to 31/10/2004 
 
Table 1a: This table presents the descriptive statistics for loss amounts by event and type of risk over a 3-
year period. 
   DPA* CPBP* EPWS* EF* IF* EDPM*
Mean $20,797 $25,582 $34,220 $2,049 $13,882 $7,479 
Median $7,728 $3,169 $12,520 $677 $2,975 $2,000 
Standard deviation $30,110 $76,304 $54,868 $13,272 $71,602 $33,012 
Kurtosis coefficient 9.25 47.66 12.54 2,722.29 78.57 341.00 
Asymmetric coefficient 2.80 6.25 3.22 46.12 8.80 15.94 
Maximum $157,138 $819,717 $334,034 $1,003,045 $645,700 $863,876 
Number of observations 53 509 97 22,178 81 1,547 
* DPA: Damage to Physical Assets / CPBP: Clients, Products and Business Practices / EPWS: Employment, 
Practices, and Workplace Safety / EF: External Fraud/ IF: Internal Fraud / EDPM: Execution, Delivery and 
Process Management 
 
 
Table 1b: This table presents daily and weekly frequencies by risk type, over 3-year period. 
Daily loss frequencies by type of risk, over a 3-year period 
 DPA* CPBP* EPWS* EF* IF* EDPM*
Mean 0.0484 0.4644 0.0885 20.2354 0.0739 1.4115 
Median 0 0 0 18 0 1 
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Variance 0.0643 1.0617 0.1209 369.7491 0.1069 9.3693 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 3 14 4 226 4 66 
Weekly loss frequencies by type of risk, over a 3-year period. 
Mean 0.3376 3.2420 0.6178 141.2611 0.5159 9.8535 
Median 0 2 0 148 0 8 
Mode 0 2 0 125 0 4 
Variance 0.4302 10.3513 0.8530 2689.7070 0.7513 87.8566 
Minimum 0 0 0 50 0 0 
Maximum 3 17 4 447 4 80 
* DPA: Damage to Physical Assets / CPBP: Clients, Products and Business Practices / EPWS: Employment, 
Practices, and Workplace Safety / EF: External Fraud/ IF: Internal Fraud / EDPM: Execution, Delivery and 
Process Management 
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Table 2: Distributions Studied 
Distribution Density functions Cumulative functions 
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Table 3: Comparison between Our Model and the Standard Model 
 
We compare the mean of annual losses (excluding external losses) as well as the annual VaR, at the 90; 
95; 99 and 99,9% level of confidence, as calculated based on the standard model and the one we have set 
up in this article for the types of risk Internal Fraud, Employment, Practices, and Workplace Safety, and 
External Fraud We present the variation in percentage of the results obtained with the standard model 
compared to the results from our model. 
 Variation of the standard model compared to our model (%) 
Types 
of risk 
Variation of 
losses /year 
Variation of 
annual VaRs at 
90% 
Variation of 
annual VaRs 
at 95% 
Variation of 
annual VaRs at 
99% 
Variation of 
annual VaRs 
at 99.9% 
IF* -0.06 -2.06 -2.18 -1.68 -1.34 
EPWS
*
-4.67 -9.40 -11.89 -17.07 -27.32 
EF* 0.95 -5.62 -13.50 -40.28 -81.59 
* IF: Internal Fraud / EPWS: Employment, Products, and Environmental Safety / EF: External Fraud  
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Table 4: Operational VaR by Type of Risk 
 
We present the results of the estimation of the mean of annual losses and annual values at risk at the 90%, 
95%, 99% and 99,9% confidence level by type of risk. These results are derived from the combination of 
scaled internal and external data. The results are presented as a percentage of the total 2004 assets of the 
bank studied. 
Types of 
risk 
Mean of 
annual loss 
(%) 
Annual VaR 
at 90% 
(%) 
Annual VaR 
at 95% 
(%) 
Annual VaR at 
99% 
(%) 
Annual VaR 
at 99.9% 
(%) 
DPA* 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.0015 0.0331 
CPBP* 0.0079 0.0064 0.0076 0.1123 0.3887 
EPWS* 0.0016 0.0021 0.0024 0.0038 0.0774 
EF* 0.0178 0.0182 0.0191 0.0727 0.2159 
IF* 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0023 0.0760 
EDPM* 0.0064 0.0058 0.0066 0.0753 0.2614 
*DPA: Damage to Physical Assets / CPBP: Clients, products and Business Practices / EPWS: 
Employment, Practices, and Workplace Safety / EF: External Fraud / IF: Internal Fraud / EDPM: 
Execution, Delivery and Process Management  
 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of the Integration of External Data on the VaR 
 
We present the results of the comparison between the mean of annual losses and the annual values at risk 
at the 90%, 95%, 99%, and 99.9% confidence level calculated based on internal data to those calculated 
based on internal and external loss data. 
 Variation of the model with internal data compared to the model with 
internal and external data (%) 
Types 
of risk 
Mean of 
annual losses 
(%) 
Annual VaR 
at 90% 
(%) 
Annual VaR 
at 95% 
(%) 
Annual VaR 
at 99% 
(%) 
Annual VaR 
at 99.9% 
(%) 
DPA* -11.83% 1.46% 3.11% 15.24% -88.73% 
EPWS* -18.42% 0.67% 3.68% -1.08% -91.26% 
IF* -57.30% -5.31% -8.98% -72.29% -98.63% 
*DPA: Damage to Physical Assets / EPWS: Employment, Practices, and Workplace Safety / IF: Internal 
Fraud. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Tables of parameters’ estimation 
 
Table A1: Estimation of Severity Distributions for the Types of Risk: IF, DPA, EPWS. 
 
Table A1a: Results from estimation of the 4 parametric distributions tested for the type of risk IF. We 
present the parameters estimated, the log-likelihood values and the p-values from the KS, AD and the 
CvM tests with parametric bootstrap. We have 84 non-truncated observations. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 13,881.70 
 
 
 
8.03 
1.36 
6,308.72 
0.59 
 
1.06 
1,001.21 
2.35 
1 
Log likelihood -853.60 -790.48 -808. 33 -788.48 
p-value KS 0 0.37 0 0.25 
p-value AD 0 0.44 0 0.27 
p-value CvM 0 0.54 0 0.30 
 
 
Table A1b: Results from estimation of the parametric distributions for the risk type DPA. We present the 
parameters estimated, the log-likelihood values and the p-values from the KS, AD and the CvM tests with 
parametric bootstrap.  We have 53 observations higher than s. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 19,797.22 
 
 
 
8.75 
1.59 
8,316.94 
0.52 
0.04 
113.55 
446.36 
373.93 
Log likelihood -577.34 -569.18 -568.21 -569.20 
p-value KS 0 0.46 NaN 0.46 
p-value AD 0 0.22 NaN 0.25 
p-value CvM 0 0.29 NaN 0.31 
 
 
Table A1c: Results from estimation of the parametric distribution for the risk type EPWS. We present the 
parameters estimated, the log-likelihood values and the p-values from the KS, AD and the CvM tests with 
parametric bootstrap. We have 97 observations higher than s. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 33,220.14 
 
 
 
9.40 
1.48 
17,214.52 
0.57 
0.05 
7.56 
418.31 
285.33 
Log likelihood -1,106.86 -1,089.61 -1,089.61 -1,089.64 
p-value KS 0 0.69 NaN 0.69 
p-value AD 0 0.51 NaN 0.37 
p-value CvM 0 0.45 NaN 0.48 
 
Table A2: Estimation of the Severity Distributions for the Risk Type CPBP 
 
Table A2a: Estimation of the tail of the distribution for the type of risk CPBP. We take different centiles 
of the empirical distribution (first column) for which the corresponding threshold as well as the size of 
sample are indicated in the second and third columns, respectively. Then we estimate the parameter of the 
Pareto distribution for each of the samples according to formula 3. The last column of the table gives the 
p-value of the KS, AD and CvM parametric-bootstrap tests. The line in bold and italics represents the 
corresponding centile, threshold, and number of observations as well as the Pareto parameter. We have 
chosen this sample because it gives us the highest p-value for the goodness of fit test. 
Centiles Threshold Size of sample Pareto  
   Coefficient p-value KS p-value AD p-value CvM 
0.65 $6,100 179 0.6191 0 0 0 
0.70 $8,900 153 0.6760 0 0 0 
0.75 $11,500 128 0.6700 0 0 0 
0.80 $16,800 102 0.6902 0 0 0 
0.85 $36,900 77 1.010 0.11 0.05 0.04 
0.90 $62,000 51 1.1810 0.37 0.14 0.14 
 
 
Table A2b: Results of the estimation of the body of the distribution for the type of risk CPBP. This deals 
with losses contained between s and $62,000. The sample includes 461 observations. The parameters for 
each of the distributions are estimated using the maximum likelihood method according to formula 5. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 6,615.32 
 
 
 
-70.05 
11.42 
11698.11 
1.3 x 10-6
4.52 
62.65 
1 
0.13 
Likelihood log -4,486.63 -4,297.83 -4,400.51 -4,297.50 
p-value KS 0 0 NaN 0.05 
p-value AD 0 0 NaN 0.24 
p-value CvM 0 0 NaN 0.01 
 
Table A3: Estimation of the Severity Distributions for the Type of Risk EDPM 
 
Table A3a: Estimation of the tail of the distribution for the type of risk EDPM. We take different centiles 
of the empirical distribution (first column) for which the corresponding thresholds as well as the size of 
sample are indicated in the second and third columns, respectively. Then, for each of the samples, we 
estimate the parameter of the Pareto distribution according to formula 3. The last column of the table gives 
the p-value of the KS, AD and CvM parametric-bootstrap tests. The line in bold and italics represents the 
corresponding centile, threshold, and number of observations as well as the Pareto parameter. We have 
chosen this sample because it gives us the highest p-value for the goodness of fit test. 
Centiles Thresholds Size of sample Pareto 
   Coefficient p-value KS p-value AD p-value CvM 
0.75 $4,295 387 0.9916 0.37 0 0.19 
0.80 $5,536 309 1.0243 0.37 0.6 0.46 
0.85 $7,480 233 1.0537 0.55 0.4 0.48 
0.90 $10,600 155 1.0168 0.06 0.14 0.09 
0.95 $22,700 78 1.1901 0.48 0.09 0.14 
0.96 $26,000 62 1.1065 0.74 0.21 0.49 
 
 
Table A3b: Results of the estimation of the left wing of the distribution for the type of risk EDPM. This 
deals with losses contained between s and s’. The sample includes 800 observations. The parameters for 
each of the distributions are estimated using the maximum likelihood method according to formula 5. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 801.62 -46.11 
7.67 
17505.54 
3.47 x 10-7 
 
15.50 
301.38 
4.53 
0.06 
Likelihood log -5,469.42 -5,459.73 -5,473.60 -5,459.70 
p-value KS 0 NaN NaN 0.08 
p-value AD 0 NaN NaN 0.24 
p-value CvM 0 NaN NaN 0.01 
 
 
Table A3c: Results of the estimation of the body of the distribution for the type of risk EDPM. This deals 
with losses contained between s’ and $26,000. The sample includes 685 observations. The parameters for 
each of the distributions are estimated using the maximum likelihood method according to formula 5. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 4,226.01 1.26 
3.058 
17,258.5 
4.25 x 10-6
1 
9.18 
87.50 
0.95 
Likelihoood log -6,388.39 -6,342.14 -6,450.22 -6,341.99 
p-value KS 0 0.27 NaN 0.38 
p-value AD 0  NaN 0.38 
p-value CvM 0  NaN 0.49 
 
Tableau A4: Estimation of Severity Distributions for the Type of Risk EF 
 
Table A4a: Estimation of the tail of the distribution for the type of risk EF. We take different centiles of 
the empirical distribution (first column) for which the corresponding thresholds as well as the size of 
sample are indicated in the second and third columns, respectively. Then, for each of the samples, we 
estimate the parameter of the Pareto distribution according to formula 3. The last column of the table gives 
the p-value of the KS, AD and CvM parametric-bootstrap tests. The line in bold and italics represents the 
corresponding centile, threshold, and number of observations as well as the Pareto parameter. We have 
chosen this sample because it gives us the highest p-value for the goodness of fit test. 
Centiles Thresholds Size of sample Pareto 
   Coefficient p-value KS p-value AD p-value CvM
0.85 $2,873 3326 1.4705 0.001 0 0 
0.90 $3 ,81 2218 1.5436 0 0 0 
0.95 $5,840 1109 1.4310 0.002 0.10 0 
0.96 $6,805 888 1.4249 0 0.03 0 
0.97 $8,275 665 1.4081 0 0 0 
0.98 $10,325 444 1.2711 0.001 0 0 
0.99 $18,300 222 1.3805 0 0 0 
0.991 $19,890 196 1.2815 0 0 0.01 
0.992 $19,890 178 1.2349 0.003 0 0.04 
0.993 $20,360 156 1.1114 0.14 0.14 0.14 
0.994 $23,900 134 1.1450 0.159 0.27 0.17 
0.995 $28,350 111 1.1550 0.107 0.13 0.10 
0.996 $38,000 89 1.3298 0.57 0 0.34 
0.997 $46,500 67 1.3017 0.567 0.07 0.23 
 
 
Table A4b: Results of the estimation of the left wing of the distribution for the type of risk EF. This deals 
with losses under $5,000. The sample includes 20,725 observations. The parameters for each of the 
distributions are estimated using the maximum likelihood method according to formula 5. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 1,082.66 
 
 
 
6.84 
1.88 
1,078.48 
0.82 
0.68 
13,723.58 
1.45 
8.80 
Likelihood log -164,374.54 -164,076.19 -163,874.14 -163,610.43 
p-value KS 0 0 NaN 0.56 
p-value AD 0 0 NaN 0.18 
p-value CvM 0 0 NaN 0.61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4c: Results of the estimation of the body of the distribution for the type of risk EF. This deals 
with losses contained between $5,000 and $38,000. The sample includes 1,364 observations. The 
parameters for each of the distributions are estimated using the maximum likelihood method according to 
formula 4. 
 Exponential Lognormal Weibull GB2 
Parameters 4,634.40 
 
 
 
-20.16 
4.22 
171,906.58 
2.98 x 10-9
6.73 
606.68 
24.69 
0.25 
Likelihood log -12,868.92 -12,804.80 -13,306.21 -12,804.74 
p-value KS 0 NaN NaN 0.18 
p-value AD 0 NaN NaN 0.03 
p-value CvM 0 NaN NaN 0.11 
 
Table A5: Estimation of the Frequency Distributions by Type of Risk 
 
We present the parameters estimated by maximum likelihood for each of the types of risk as well as the 
value of the likelihood-log function and the p-value of the  test. For the last four types of risk, we 
present the value of the corrected parameters in order to take into account the truncature of the data. 
2χ
 
Table A5a: Estimation of the frequency distribution for the type of risk IF. 
 Daily frequencies Weekly frequencies 
 Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Parameters 0.0739 
 
0.1810 
0.7100 
0.5159 1.0034 
0.6604 
Likelihood log -304.7151 -287.7930 -158.2382 -152.6294 
Likelihood ration 33.8441 11.2376 
p-value (test ) 2χ 0 0.177 0.013 0.846 
 
 
Table A5b: Estimation of the frequency distribution for the type of risk EF. 
 Daily frequencies Weekly frequencies 
 Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Parameters 20.2350 
 
0.7760 
0.0369 
141.2611 
 
8.7775 
0.0585 
Likelihood log -11,808.4500 -4,401.9390 -1,893.8787 -827.9793 
Likelihood ratio 14,813.0220 2,131.7987 
p-value (test ) 2χ 0 0 0 0.269 
 
 
Table A5c: Estimation of the frequency distribution for the type of risk DPA. 
 Daily frequencies Weekly frequencies 
 Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Parameters 0.0484 0.1280 
0.7260 
0.3376 1.1366 
0.7710 
Corrected 
parameters 
0.0569 0.1280 
0.6925 
0.3972 1.1366 
0.7411 
Likelihood log -220.1877 -208.9131 -120.7829 -118.6158 
Likelihood ratio 22.5492 4.3341 
p-value (test ) 2χ 0.001 0.589 0.06 0.493 
 
 
Table A5d: Estimation of the frequency distribution for the type of risk EPWS. 
 Daily frequencies Weekly frequencies 
 Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Parameters 0.0885 0.2304 
0.7225 
0.6170 
 
1.6894 
0.7322 
Corrected 
parameters 
0.0983 0.2304 
0.7009 
0.6856 1.6894 
0.7110 
Likelihood log -346.1778 -330.4865 -171.9059 -168.1748 
Likelihood ratio 31.3825 7.4622 
p-value (test ) 2χ 0 0.459 0.026 0.416 
 
 
Table A5e: Estimation of the frequency distribution for the type of risk CPBP. 
 Daily frequencies Weekly frequencies 
 Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Parameters 0.4644 
 
0.4282 
0.4797 
3.2420 1.5917 
0.3293 
Corrected 
parameters 
0.5464 0.4282 
0.4394 
3.8141 1.5917 
0.2944 
Likelihood log -1114.0496 -984.0448 -426.8773 -360.0661 
Likelihood log 260.0097 133.6224 
p-value (test ) 2χ 0 0.935 0 0.166 
 
 
Table A5f: Estimation of the frequency distribution for the type of risk EDPM. 
 Daily frequencies Weekly frequencies 
 Poisson Negative 
binomial  
Poisson Negative 
binomial 
Parameters 1.4115 
 
0.6131 
0.3028 
9.8535 
 
2.0069 
0.1692 
Corrected 
parameters 
2.3525 0.6131 
0.2067 
16.4225 2.0069 
0.1089 
Likelihood log -2363.4134 -1773.0805 -791.8502 -510.3689 
Likelihood log 1180.6659 562.9626 
p-value (test ) 2χ 0 0.002 0 0.382 
 
Table A6: Standard Model  
 
We present the standard model for which the severity and frequency models are hypothesized to be 
lognormal and Poisson, respectively Losses below the collection threshold are not considered. The results 
are presented for the types of risk DPA, EPWS, and IF. 
 
Table A6: We present the parameters estimated by maximum likelihood for the lognormal and Poisson 
distributions, for the types of risk DPA, EPWS, and IF. 
Types of risk Lognormal Poisson 
IF* 8.03 
1.36 
0.52 
EPWS* 9.55 
1.35 
0.62 
 
EF* 6.41 
1.60 
141.26 
* IF : Internal Fraud / EPWS: Employment, Practices, and Workplace Safety / EF: External Fraud  
 
Appendix 2 : Goodness of fit tests with parametric bootstrap procedure 
 
A2.1:  KS Test with parametric bootstrap procedure 
Unlike the classic test, this method consists in using a Monte Carlo simulation to calculate a p-
value at the critical values. The p-value allows us to decide whether or not to reject the null 
hypothesis stipulating the proper fit for the data distribution. The critical values will thus be 
calculated based on the samples generated. Calculating the p-value is thus a matter of carrying 
out the steps of the following algorithm: 
( ) ( )δ−= ˆ;sup xFxFnKS X
x
1- Calculate the statistic KS , such that: 0 , with the 
distribution function whose parameters have already been estimated as δˆ . 
2- Use the parameters estimated for the distribution to be tested to generate a sample 
of losses equal in size to those in the initial sample. 
θ~3- Based on the sample generated, estimate the parameters  of the same 
distribution, using the maximum likelihood method. 
4- Calculate statistic KSi  using the distribution sample whose newly calculated 
parameters are θ~ . 
5- Compare statistics KS0  and KS . If KSi 0 < KSi , then a counter j increases by 1. 
6- Repeat steps 2, 3, 4 and 5, a great number of times N (ex. N=10, 000) 
N
j
pv =  7- Calculate the p-value as being  
8- Reject the null hypothesis, if the p-value (pv) is less than the confidence level 
(5%). 
A2.2: Khi-two Test with parametric bootstrap procedure 
This test requires that the data be grouped in classes. The test’s statistic is calculated as follows 
(Klugman, Panjer, and Willmot, 1998): 
( )∑
=
−=
k
1i
2
j
jj
E
En
Q  
with: 
nj:  Number of observations in the group j, with j=1, …k 
Ej: Number of observations expected in each group, given that the model is correct and the 
parameters have their estimated values. It is calculated: ( )θ∈= ˆ  ;group jXPrnE thj  for 
j=1…k 
where n is the tail of the sample. 
This statistic is compared to a tabulated critical value. In effect, if Q exceeds  (where d=k-r-1 is 
the number of degrees of freedom and  is the significance threshold) then the null hypothesis is rejected. 
However, for the test’s weaker results, we propose the bootstrap-parametric method to calculate the p-
value of the test. 
2
,d αχ
α
This method, unlike the classic test, consists in calculating a p-value and the critical values by 
Monte Carlo simulation. The value of the p-value allows us to decide whether or not we reject the null 
hypothesis stipulating the right fit for the distribution to the data. Thus, the critical values will be 
calculated based on the samples generated. It is a matter of applying the following algorithm to calculate 
the p-value. 
1. Construct groups (refer to Klugman et al, 1998). 
2. Calculate the number of losses nj in each group. 
3. Calculate ( )θˆE j  for each group, where θ  are the estimated parameters of the distribution to 
be tested (Poisson or negative binomial). 
ˆ
4. Calculate the Q  statistic as defined above. 0
5. Use the estimated parameters of the distribution to be tested to generate the loss frequencies 
of the same sample as our initial sample. 
θ~6. Based on the sample generated, estimate the  parameters of the same distribution with the 
maximum likelihood method. 
7. Calculate nj, ( )θ~E j , and the statistic Q . i
8. Compare the statistics Q  and Q0 i. If Q0  < Q , then a counter h increases by 1. i
9. Repeat steps 5 to 8 a great number of times N (ex. N = 10,000). 
N
hpv =10. Calculate the p-value as being . 
11. Reject the null hypothesis, if the p-value (pv) is less than the level of confidence (5%).
Appendix 3 : Algorithm for the aggregation of internal and external loss data 
 
Since we want to calculate the VaR by type of risk, we thus repeat this algorithm for each of them. 
1. Generate a number n of daily or weekly losses according to the frequency distribution of 
internal data. 
2. Generate n amounts of losses Xi (i = 1… n) according to the severity distribution estimated 
for internal data, on a daily or weekly basis. We constrain the losses generated to be below 
the equivalent of $1 M US. 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for N = 365 (daily losses) or N = 52 (weekly losses). Sum up all the Xi 
amounts generated to obtain S1, the portion of the annual loss from amounts of less than $1 M 
US. 
4. Generate a number n* of annual losses according to the Poisson distribution for modeling 
external data. 
5. Generate n* amounts of losses X*i (i = 1… n*) according to the severity distribution of 
external data. We constrain the losses generated to be less than the equivalent of $1 M US. 
The sum of the amounts generated gives S2, the portion of the annual losses from losses of 
more than $1 M US. 
6. The total annual loss S is equal to S1 + S2. 
7. Repeat steps 1 to 6 a great number of times (1,000,000 for example) to obtain the distribution 
of annual losses. 
8.  The VaR is calculated by taking the 99.9% percentile of the empirical distribution of annual 
losses. 
 
